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Christianity and Time 
Robert Cummings Neville 
Boston University 
CHRISTIANITY HAS NO one theory of 
time. But there are several constraints that 
Christian conceptions of time should meet, 
among which are the following three. First, 
Christianity arose within a fundamental 
monotheistic assumption that the world is 
created by God, and therefore time must be 
related to divine creation somehow. Second, 
Christianity arose in response to the person 
of Jesus of Nazareth who was supposed 
from the earliest times to have been 
historically decisive so that time needs to be 
understood in part in terms of history. Third, 
Christianity carries on always in the 
conceptual world of the cultures it engages, 
currently that of late-modem science, and 
therefore now it must come to terms with 
time as defined by physical cosmology as 
well as other sciehces. Conceptions of time 
in Christianity thus need to be understood 
historically in retation to the historically 
developing conceptions of God and creation, 
of the meaning and significance of Jesus 
Christ, and of physical cosmology. 
In the ancient world, eternity was more 
an object of religious interest than time. Or 
more exactly, time and eternity were thought 
of together. I This surely holds for Christi-
anity in the ancient world and down through 
the Christian medieval period in the West. 
The temporality of historical existence could 
not be conceived except in close connection 
with eternity. 
By no means was there unanimity 
about the nature of eternity or time.2 
Nevertheless, although the Platonic assump-
tion that time is the moving image of 
eternity was not universally held, something 
like that formed the background in terms of 
which the essential dependence of time on 
eternity was variously analysed. The 
Christian version of this was that the world 
of human affairs is temporal (in some sense 
or other) and is created by God who is 
eternal (in some sense or other). 
European modernity, in a striking shift, 
diminished and then suppressed conceptions 
of eternity and treated time as the primary 
reality. Kant famously claimed time to be 
the form of inner sense and the necessary 
condition for the knowability of anything.3 
In our own days, it is common for Christian 
theologians to believe that their topic is the 
Christian narrative or story, a kind of 
salvation history.4 Process theologians are 
perhaps the most straightforward in 
abandoning, nay attacking, any sense in 
which God is said to be eternal and time 
derivative from that.5 
How should that extraordinary shift be 
understood and assessed? I shall offer some 
conceptual and historical observations about 
the shift, and then argue that Christianity 
today is better served by regarding time and 
eternity as one topic, defending a theory that 
holds eternity to be the true identity of 
temporal things. 
Christian Developments' 
Christianity began in its first generation as a 
form of Second Temple Judaism. Judaism in 
most of its manifestations then was already 
significantly hellenized. Although Jesus and 
his disciples came from small-town Galilee, 
the earliest Christian writing in the New 
Testament, Paul's first letter to the 
Thessalonians, was addressed to an urban 
congregation of non-Jewish Christians. 
Begun with a transformative experience of a 
group of international pilgrims (Acts 2), 
Christianity emerged as a cosmopolitan 
religion of the hellenistic world.6 
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Recognizing this fact, we must remind 
ourselves that early Christian conceptuality 
involved a very high stack of layered 
metaphoric systems. The metaphoric 
systems within the Hebrew Bible, which the 
first Christians had in Greek translation as 
the Septuagint, were themselves extremely 
diverse. Early images of Yahweh as a storm-
god are mixed with images of God as a 
warrior delivering Israel from Egypt, as a 
creator-potter shaping human beings from 
clay, as a king over Israel or over the entire 
world, as the majestic creator of everything 
beginning with a big-bang-like Light, as the 
creator who told Job there is no place to 
stand to understand God's creation. There 
are of course other metaphoric systems for 
God's relation with the world in the Bible. 
The hellenistic context of early Christianity 
included the problem of a divine con-
frontation with cosmic evil, as reflected in 
Zoroastrianism, and apocalyptic expecta-
tions of the end of the world. Moreover, the 
educated hellenized Jews and early non-
Jewish Christians of the first and second 
centuries would have been familiar with the 
Greek philosophic schools, or at least their 
main ideas. Justin Martyr, a Christian 
theologian. of the second century used the 
Greek form-matter distinction to say that 
God creates not just order but everything, 
even that which would be chaotic if not 
ordered. 
The important point to recognize is that 
all of these metaphoric systems, and many 
more besides, were exercised together in the 
imaginations of the early Christians. They 
. did not think with only the very 
anthropomorphic conceptions, or only the 
very philosophic ones, but all together. The 
early Christian imagination embraced them 
all, with much inter-resonance and mutual 
reinforcement. German scholars in the 
nineteenth century attempted to draw a sharp 
distinction between "Jerusalem" and 
"Athens", the point being that Christianity 
was corrupted by Greek philosophy which 
sullied its purity as a Semitic religion. But 
this was hostile hindsight, prompted by anti-
philosophical nineteenth (and twentieth) 
century motives. The hellenistic world of 
Christianity and Time 9 
early Christianity was already a pluralistic 
culture with many capitols, and this fact 
stood in striking contrast with the rabbinic 
culture of talmudic Judaism which emerged 
after the Bar Kochba revolts of the second 
century as the other major form of Second 
Temple Judaism to last beyond the 
destruction of the Temple to our own day. 
Medieval western European Christi-
anity enhanced the role of philosophic con-
ceptions of eternity and time in the great 
scholastic debates, nurtured by the dialogues 
, with Judaism and Islam, and by the recovery 
of Aristotle's texts and more texts of Plato. 
Driven to clarify the uniqueness of the 
creator, medieval Christian theologians 
emphasized God's transcendence and 
internal simplicity. As Thomas Aquinas 
said, God is not in a genus and hence is no 
kind of thing. Although such theological 
reasoning is a far cry from the biblical 
imagery of God acting in and for the world, 
medieval Christianity set it in resonance 
with an extraordinary, vivid conception of 
cosmic place. From the human perspective, 
the historical world was pictured as nested 
between heaven and hell, with the places of 
limbo and purgatory too. The great question 
for every human being then is geographic 
destiny: where to end up! Within this 
cultural imagery, human time is the brief 
historical span within· which decisions are 
made that result in one's geographic destiny. 
Present life is the time of decisive action. 
After immortal placement, which might 
involve a term in purgatory, time is nothing 
more than more of the same, a kind of 
endless temporal extension of static bliss or 
torment. It is the eschatological place with 
its qualities, not what goes on within it in a 
changing or historical sense, that counts. 
The medieval representation of escha-
tological place and decisive and enduring 
times is clearly a schematization of how 
finite temporal human life can relate to the 
eternal infinity of God. As Kant said that a 
schema is a way of translating a non-spatio-
temporal thing into the structures of space-
time, so all religions have schemata whereby 
what is not thinkable within the human 
sphere can be translated into the terms of 
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huma~ life. The great religions of the world 
all represent the ultimate as not within the 
structures of ordinary life, except by descent 
or incarnation; so they must all imagine the 
meeting of the human project with the 
ultimate in some schema. All the major 
religions, for instance, have images of 
heaven in which people can imagine "going 
to" God, "entering the divine presence", 
"working out one's justification", or some 
such. Religions differ in how heaven is 
imagined. Kant distinguished between a 
schema and a schema-image: the imagina-
tive rules for constructing the spatio-
temporal structure of "place" is the schema 
for the conjunction of the finite and infinite, 
whereas the throne-room, the golden city, or 
the garden is the schema-image.7 
Although we are inclined to associate 
the medieval imagery of cosmic 
eschatological place with popular religion 
and conceptions of divine transcendence 
with elite theologians, in fact the religious 
culture integrated them in the ways the 
relatively pure thinking, schemata, and 
schema-images were integrated. Persons 
whose imaginations are limited to the 
schema-images of popular religion might· 
not be aware of the fact that the images 
derive from schemata for representing an 
eternal and nowhere God in a spatio-
temporal frame friendly to human contact, 
though most would say, when pressed, that 
God does not really wear a robe with a hem 
(Isaiah 6:1) or have a right hand by which 
Jesus sits (Colossians 3:1). They would say 
only that this is a right way to picture God. 
They would be very unlikely to be aware of 
conceptions of divine purity, simplicity, and 
unchangeableness. Popular images are 
deceptive when inferences are drawn from 
them that ignore the imaginative rules that 
connect them to the reality they are 
schematizing. So, the beliefs that a deep 
enough mine should end up in hell and that 
the cosmonauts should find God if there is 
one are mistakes that come from neglecting 
the fact that the images of hell and heaven 
are justifiably derived only from schematic 
rules for translating the meeting of finite and 
infinite into finite terms. One of the 
functions of theology is the circumscription 
of the schema-images of popular religion in 
terms of their justifiable ground in reality 
otherwise conceived. Theologians in Christi-
anity, as well as the other great religions, are 
aware of the limits of conceptions of the real 
and hence acknowledge apophatic moments. 
The modem period of Western culture 
destroyed the possibility of taking the 
ancient or medieval schema-images of 
cosmic eschatological reality at face value. 
Modem astronomy and earth science shape 
the imagination so that heaven and hell find 
no place, and the modem measurements of 
time do not allow the distinction between a 
life's time of eschatologically significant 
actions and an immortal time of unchanging 
bliss or torment. If those images of popular 
Christianity are to be employed today, they 
need to be regarded as what I call "broken 
symbols" in order to be addressed to the 
modem imagination.8 Kant himself argued 
that anything to be regarded as real needs to 
be schematized to the form of time in the 
human mind. He denied that there could be 
knowledge of things that are non-temporal 
even if they are also schematizable in space-
time terms; this is what he meant by denying 
the possibility of metaphysics. Believing 
him, many subsequent thinkers have rejected 
the cognitive elements of Christianity which 
say so much about the eternal God (and 
either affirm pietism or reject Christianity). 
Theologians for their part have tried to 
conceive of God in temporal terms, either 
metaphysically like the process theologians 
or imagistically like the narrative theo-
logians. Thus has arisen' the situation 
described at the beginning of this paper.9 
A Contemporary Christian Theory of 
Time and Eternity 
There are many reasons for not accepting 
Kant's rejection of a metaphysics that might 
know something beyond temporal schemata. 
One is that the premise of his argument, that 
knowledge in mathematics and science is 
based on synthetic Ii priori principles, is 
generally rejected today, and has been since 
the development of non-Euclidean geome-
tries. A second is that classical pragmatism 
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developed a conception of metaphysics to 
which Kant's critique does not apply even if 
his argument were valid against the kind of 
metaphysics he attacked.!O A third is that 
Alfred North Whitehead actually developed 
a serious metaphysical system explaining 
how mathematics applies to the world 
without conforming to the form of human 
experience; if Whitehead's metaphysics is 
mistaken, it is mistaken in its particular 
assertions, not in being metaphysics.!! 
Christian theology today is in a position 
to return to issues of time and eternity and 
formulate conceptions that on the one hand 
can retrieve the ancient images now as 
broken symbols and on the other hand feed 
the contemporary. imagination with positive 
symbols attuned to the vastness of the 
cosmos conceived by late-modem science. 
What follows is a sketch of a metaphysical 
hypothesis with reflections on its 
applications. 
Let us suppose that there are three 
modes of time - past, present, and future -
and that each has two kinds of features -
essential and conditional.!2 The essential 
features are those that define the uniqueness 
of the modes, and the conditional ones relate 
the modes to one another· so that time 
"flows".13 The essential features ofthe past 
have to do with actual, fixed, achievement. 
Those of the present have to do with 
decisive becoming or actualization, with 
decisions made among alternative 
possibilities. The essential features of the 
future are those having to do with pure form. 
The future functions conditionally in the 
past by providing the possibilities that have 
been actualized by present decisions, 
including the values actualized. The present 
functions conditionally in the past by 
actualizing more possibilities into 
conformity with what had previously been 
actualized, so that the past is always 
growing and extending, as it were. The past 
functions conditionally in the present by 
providing the potentialities for becoming 
that the decisive, creative present has to 
integrate in its becoming; when a present 
moment has fully become, it is past and 
incapable of further change. The future 
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functions conditionally in the present to 
provide possibilities for integrating the past 
potentialities for becoming. The past 
functions conditionally in the future by 
providing the actual things that need to be 
integrated and thus require pure form to be 
determinate, limiting purely logical possi-
bilities to real ones. The present functions 
conditionally in the future by actualizing 
new things so that the structure of real 
possibilities is constantly shifting. 
Time's flow requires the togetherness 
of the three kinds of dynamism, the steady 
growth of the past, the creative decisive 
novelty of the present, and the shifting 
kaleidoscope of real possibilities of the 
future. Nineteenth-century scientific 
imagery emphasizes the growth of the past, 
minimizing or denying creative novelty and 
alternative possibilities. Existentialism, 
process philosophy, and many kinds of 
Buddhism emphasize the present mode of 
time as becoming, minimizing or denying 
the reality of the past and the normative 
structure of the future. When present 
experience is emphasized, with the 
intentional structure of consciousness, 
change itself is minimized or denied as in 
some forms of advaita Hinduism. In 
Christianity, God's time (or eternity) has 
been represented asa totum sim,u/ gaze 
encompassing all times as if they were 
present. The optional structure of shifting or 
shiftable future possibilities is emphasized 
by some artists and moral thinkers, though· 
usually without losing sight. of the different 
dynamics of the present and past. Time's 
flow requires the togetherness of all three. A 
situation with a future date and containing 
alternative possibilities is rendered wholly 
definite by present decisions and added in 
fixed form to extend the past. The human 
experience of time's flow in the present 
apprehends a real future constraining and 
rushing toward us, and a real past into which 
our present actions and enjoyed qualities 
pass. Human moral identity requires the 
. togetherness of all moments of life as future 
options to be decided, as present acts of 
decisions, and as pasts for which the 
deciding presents are or were responsible. 
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Thus true temporal human identity is 
eternal, requiring that one eternally be the 
one who as a youth had a wide-open future, 
who as middle-aged was committed to a 
way of life, and who as old was almost 
wholly definite. 14 
The actual structures of the three kinds 
of dynamics and their interconnection may 
not be as commonsense has them. Modem 
physics suggests some structures that are 
hard to imagine and perhaps counter-
intuitive. This abstract hypothesis about the 
dynamics of the three modes of time allows 
for anything that science might suggest as 
time's structure relative to space, mass, and 
motion. 
What is the togetherness of the three 
modes of time such that time flows? It 
cannot be a temporal togetherness: the past 
is not before the present, nor the future after. 
Only the togetherness of the modes, ordered 
by the linear order of dates whereby present 
moments come to actualization, fixing the 
past and reordering the future, makes it 
possible for some things to occur in time 
before others, conditioning them. The linear 
order of dates and simultaneity are compli-
cated notions in modem physics; but 
however the causation works, temporal flow 
can be understood according to this 
hypothesis. _ 
Rather, the togetherness of the modes 
of time is eternity.15 What we ought to mean 
legitimately by eternity is the togetherness 
of the temporal modes. Eternity need not be 
conceived to be static, which is how most 
modems would represent it, as if it were a 
form (an "eternal object" is Whitehead's 
phrase). Rather it is the inclusive composite 
dynamism of the three kinds of dynamism 
that make time possible - growing past, 
creative present, and shifting formal future. 
Christians arguing for divine creation 
can conceive the eternity within which time 
flows as the terminus or result of the divine 
creative act.16 The act itself is not in time, 
because it creates time. The act is singular, 
encompassing not only all things, but all 
dates of all things, within its complex 
nature. As the medievals saw, God so 
conceived does not have any potentials that 
are unactualized because all actualizations, 
finite creative acts, and possibilities are the 
result of the divine creative act. But as the 
ancient Christians saw, God is fully alive, 
containing all changes within the divine 
actuality. The divine life is not like our lives, 
lived from present moment to moment, with 
the past slipping out of touch and the future 
hard to imagine and manage. The divine life 
is far more dynamic than that, including all 
moments exhibiting the dynamism of the 
growing past, the becoming present, and the 
structurally shifting future. The divine life is 
never "now" because it contains every date 
within it as a "now" as well as as a "past" 
and as a "future possibility" relative to every 
other date as now, past, or even further in 
the future. This is an extremely rich notion 
of eternity that does justice to its ancient 
usages as describing the living God and to 
its medieval usages for articulating God's 
transcendence of all idolatrous finite 
ascriptions. It expresses the dictum that 
eternity and time are one topic, each 
conceived in terms of the other. 
History is to be understood as 
important within this conception of time and 
eternity because there is a real causal 
asymmetry to time's flow, with decisive 
events fixing the past and altering future 
possibilities. History itself, of course, 
involves human meaning, and the history 
important in Christian claims about Jesus is 
about historical life on earth as understood 
especially in terms of the history of Israel. 
To claim that Jesus is the centre of history, 
closing off certain possibilities and opening 
up others for intelligent sinful beings on 
other planets with no part so far in our 
history, is hard to make interesting to the 
modem imagination. But if it is to be made 
interesting, it will be by establishing causal 
temporal connections between our history 
and theirs. More likely, Jesus will be seen as 
the incarnation of the fundamental principles 
of divine creation (the Logos) for earthly 
history, with other possibilities for the 
histories of other planets.17 
From our finite perspectives within 
time's flow, the past is both a burden and the 
source of our potentials; it constitutes the 
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achievement of our lives and society. The 
future is both an opening for free choice 
sometimes, and the headlong rush of what 
William James called a "force option". From 
the present perspective, the human future is 
somewhat open. If God were in the present, 
the future would be open for God as well, 
who at most could make well-infonned 
predictions; but .. God is not in the present, 
God is eternal. It makes perfect sense in our 
present sufferings to lament our past sins 
and plead for future life beyond what seems 
possible or likely. Not to beg God for the 
future for which we . long would be to deny 
our temporal nature. So we can schematize 
God as being in time, listening to prayers 
and working providentially.ls But that is 
only a schema for eternity relative to our 
temporality. The truth is, God is the eternal 
creative act within which time's flow has its 
being. 
At one level, this Christian view of 
time and eternity is at odds with all the 
Hindu views according to which the root 
experience of reality is based on metaphors 
of consciousness. Consciousness is like a 
gaze, an intuition, and as a model for reality 
lends itself to the inference that the really 
real cannot be changing. For ·if something 
changes, then its past is out of conscious 
sight and the future not yet detenninate for 
conscious discrimination. The Christian root 
experience is of change, especially change 
in soul relative to God, change from sinner 
to saint. Human identity endures through 
change because the New Creature, to use St 
Paul's phrase, is still the same person who 
previously was lost in bondage to sin. An 
underlying unchanging reality impervious to 
salvific transfonnation would be beside the 
point, according to root Christian con-
victions, contrary to many fonns of 
Hinduism that treat changes as relatively 
superficial. History is important within 
Christianity precisely because the really real 
in human life has to be subject to 
transfonnation. 
At another level, the hypothesis here of 
time and eternity is not far from conceptions 
such as Ramanuja's that the temporal world 
is the body of God. God is temporal only in 
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bodily movement and from temporal 
perspectives within that movement. With 
respect to the Christian hypothesis, God 
does not first create the earlier event and 
subsequently create the later, but instead 
eternally and singularly creates the events 
such that one is earlier, open to possibilities 
in the later, and the other is later, detennined 
by what is fixed in the earlier. So with 
Ramanuja's God: apart from the temporal 
body, God is unchanging; but God eternally 
bodies forth such that there are earlier and 
later events and God is not apart from the 
temporal world. So the Christian creator-
God is eternally creative and it is within that 
divine life that Christians believe we live 
and move and have our (eternal temporal) 
being. 
Notes 
1. "Time and eternity make one topic, not 
two", writes Peter Manchester in reference 
to late antique Mediterranean thought, 
including Christianity; see his "The 
Religious Experience of Time and Eternity", 
in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: 
Egyptian, Greek, Roman, edited by A. H. 
Armstrong (New York: Crossroad, 1986), p. 
384. 
2. Richard Sorabji's extraordinary study Time, 
Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in 
Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1983) is an 
indispensable source for tracing out the 
various main positions and their critical 
interactions. 
3. See his Critique of Pure Reason, translated 
by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: 
Macmillan, 1956; first edition [A] 1781, 
second edition [B] 1787), part 1, 
"transcendental aesthetic". 
4. Oscar Cullman can write, for instance, that 
"If we wish to understand the Primitive 
Christian use of aion ("age"), we thus must 
free ourselves completely from all 
philosophical concepts of time and eternity", 
in Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian 
Conception of Time and History, translated 
by Floyd V. Filson (revised edition; 
Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1964), p. 
48. See also Hans Frei's The Eclipse of 
Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth 
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and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), an 
analytical complaint that elevated narrative 
to the dominance of postmodern or 
postIiberal theology. For a critique of the 
cogency of narrative for such a framing of 
religion, see David Tracy's Plurality and 
Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope 
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987). 
5. The classic text is Alfred North Whitehead's 
Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 
1929). See also Charles Hartshorne's The 
Divine Relativity (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1948), John B. Cobb Jr's A 
Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1965), and Marjorie Hewett 
Suchocki's God-Christ-Church (Revised 
edition; New York: Crossroad, 1989). For a 
systematic criticism, see Robert Cummings 
Neville's Creativity and God: A Challenge 
to Process Theology (New edition; Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995; 
original edition 1980). 
6. See Wayne A. Meeks' The First Urban 
Christians: The Social World of the Apostle 
Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1983). 
7. For Kant's discussion, see The Critique of 
Pure Reason, B 170-187. For my technical 
discussion of Kant's theory of schematism 
in the context of a larger theory of 
imagination, see my Reconstruction of 
Thinking, part 2, especially pp. 149-52, 183-
86,' 222-28; 245-58, 168-84. For the 
application particularly to religious symbols 
of the ultimate, see my The Truth of Broken 
Symbols, chapters 1-3. 
8. See The Truth of Broken Symbols, preface. 
9. I have analysed this situation in more detail 
in Eternity and Time's Flow (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993), 
chapters 1-3. Chapter 3 in particular deals 
with Kant and Whitehead. 
10. See my The Highroad around Modernism, 
preface, chapters 1 and 6. 
11. See his Process and Reality. See my 
criticism in Creativity and God (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995; 
original edition 1980). Actually, it might be 
argued that Whitehead's conception of God 
and mathematics does indeed schematize 
them to the temporal form of human 
experience, and hence that his is a 
metaphysics within the Kantian mode. How~ 
ever, Whitehead was clear that metaphysics 
has reference beyond what is schematized, 
and it was transcendent reference that Kant 
denied. 
12. This hypothesis is argued in great detail in 
my Recovery of the Measure: Interpretation 
and Nature (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1989), chapters 9 and 10. 
See also Eternity and Time's Flow, part 2. 
13. For a phenomenological as well as logical 
analysis of temporal flow, see Eternity and 
Time's Flow, chapter 7. 
14. For a more complete argument that moral 
identity through time is eternal, see Eternity 
and Time's Flow, chapters 3 and 13. 
15. Eternity and Time's Flow, chapter 8. 
16. To connect these claims with a theory of 
divine creation see my God the Creator; see 
also Eternity and Time's Flow, parts 3 and 4. 
17. For a conception of a contemporary 
Christian theory of Logos and incarnation, 
consistent with this hypothesis about time, 
eternity, and creation, see my A Theology 
Primer (Albany: State University of New 
York, 1991). Indeed, perhaps Jesus is the 
fulfilment of the historical promises of God 
only for Israel's history, with other sources 
of religious renewal for the ancient Chinese, 
Africans, and so forth; only after Jesus did 
those histories intertwine and Christianity 
define itself in terms of Chinese, African, 
European, and other cultural symbols. To 
affirm the historical centrality of Jesus for 
Christians is not necessarily to deny 
different histories, with different religious 
centres, for other peoples. 
18. See Eternity and Time's Flow, chapters 12~ 
16. 
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